In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy...

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer and the responder.

The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on wages when production needs two different types of labor. The difference with previous works is that we endogeneize the supplies of each type of labor.