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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version

Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010670654

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version

Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587848

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568127

Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any … allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109608

Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium

Dávila, Julio; Eeckhout, Jan - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126704

"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751337

Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications

Galenianos, Manolis; Kircher, Philipp - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. The main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous. Wage dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102100

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

surplus in the absence of interagent transfers. Most of the work in the large bargaining-and matching literature ignores this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822874

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700277

Pricing in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456313