Growing demand for cropland products has placed intense pressure on the ability of land resources to support nature, straining public budgets to purchase environmental goods. Fixing overall agricultural output, two policy options are whether to promote more extensive and nature friendly farming...

In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in...

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

 Growing demand for cropland products has placed intense pressure on the abilityof land resources to support nature, straining public budgets to purchase environmental goods.Fixing overall agricultural output, two environmental policy options are whether to a) promotemore agricultural...

We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the...

In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is...

We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends...

This paper analyses two anti-terrorism policies when a targeted nation's people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad. A country's deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected, while its preemption decision typically gives external...

We develop democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules can yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the...

The ibiCash Protocol serves as a mechanism for encapsulating the time value of forests within a currency made up of units which represent the intangible value of 1 hectare of standing forest for the period of a single day in each of the world's ecoregions. At the end of each day, the system...