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Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
Oechssler, Jörg; Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422173
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Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie
Holler, Manfred J. - In: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 222 (2002) 5, pp. 556-583
Zusammenfassung Im folgenden Überblick zur Geschichte der Spieltheorie stehen die unterschiedlichen Annahmen über die … Entwicklung der Spieltheorie begleiteten und zu dem führten, was viele als ihren Fortschritt ansehen. Die erste Stufe der … Entwicklung, die Klassische Spieltheorie, ist durch John von Neumanns und Oskar Morgensterns Werk „Game Theory and Economic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014608902
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Conflict Networks
Franke, Jörg; Öztürk, Tahir - 2009
Conflict parties are frequently involved into more than one conflict at a given time. In this paper the interrelated structure of conflictive relations is modeled as a conflict network where opponents are embedded in a local structure of bilateral conflicts. Conflict parties invest in specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265777
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The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2010
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274929
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Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group
Noussair, Charles N.; Tan, Fangfang - 2009
We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276039
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Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277486
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Bargaining in international conflicts
Lockhart, Charles - 1979
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000000950
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Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war
Ponsati, Clara; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 157-179
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317128
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Organizational structure as the channeling of boundedly rational pre-play communication
Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert - 2006
We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281254
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Brothers in Arms: Cooperation in Defence
Hugh-Jones, David; Zultan, Roi - 2010
In experiments, people behave more cooperatively when they are aware of an external threat, while in the field, we observe surprisingly high levels of cooperation and altruism within groups in conflict situations such as civil wars. We provide an explanation for these phenomena. We introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281673