) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result …

sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity … property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty. We apply the … implementation concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes, in combination with unanimity …

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference …

mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important …