''surprise'' bonus payment. The other is a more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual … frequently. These hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. The tests yield that … investigate and confirm the robustness of these findings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the …

"surprise" bonus payment. The other is a more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual … frequently. These hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. The tests yield that … investigate and confirm the robustness of these findings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the …

"surprise" bonus payment. The other is a more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual … frequently. These hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. The tests yield that … investigate and confirm the robustness of these findings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the …

surprise bonus payment. The other is a more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual performance … hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. The tests yield that hypotheses (ii) and (iii … confirm the robustness of these findings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the evaluation of …

provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss … probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of …

provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss … probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of …

"surprise" bonus payment. The other isa more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual ….These hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. Thetests yield that hypotheses (ii) and (iii … confirm the robustness of thesefindings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the evaluation of …

provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss … probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of …

particular to assess whether the provision of employment protection induces less effort among workers in the form of absenteeism …. We also discuss how this evidence can be used to estimate what the absenteeism rate would be in Italy if employment …

particular to assess whether the provision of employment protection induces less effort among workers in the form of absenteeism …. We also discuss how this evidence can be used to estimate what the absenteeism rate would be in Italy if employment …