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Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness … opinions in an allocation decision. The setting allows for different focal fairness rules to be considered. We compare … the driving force behind this result: impartial decision makers deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751924

The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance

Morell, Alexander - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different group identities among participants. They play a dictator game. Dictators either play with a recipient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212944

Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities

Bland, James; Nikiforakis, Nikos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can affect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We fi?nd that third-party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698194

How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision Makers: An Experiment

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

We study how participation in decision processes shapes people's behavior towards impartial authorities. In an incentivized laboratory experiment, an impartial decision maker at first decides about the allocation of money between two subordinates. Treatments differ in the opportunity for one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010740227

The People’s Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Inclination of Prosecutors to Abuse the Vague Definition of Crimes

Engel, Christoph; Pluta, Alicja - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

Legal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226923

Words Substitute Fists – Justifying Punishment in a Public Good Experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does not benefit from contributions to the public good....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963

Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment

Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667903

Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment

Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667907

Estimation of the House Money Effect Using Hurdle Models

Engel, Christoph; Moffat, Peter G. - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553336

The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

Langenbach, Pascal - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781566