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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which … factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … identifiabilitiy (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation … inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation … inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985504
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Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which … factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932891
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which … factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurance) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530065
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurance) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580428
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2012
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281621
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539175
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 205-218
The market for retail financial products (e.g., investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702945