In a laboratory experiment, subjects played ten two-person 3x3 constant sum games and stated beliefs about the frequencies of play by their opponents. Contrary to previous experimental evidence, game-theoretical predictions work well: 80% of actions coincided with Nash equilibrium, subjects were...

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits....

In many research contexts it is necessary to group experimental subjects into behavioral “types.” Usually, this is done by pre-specifying a set of candidate decision-making heuristics and then assigning each subject to the heuristic that best describes his/her behavior. Such approaches might...

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

We perform a further experiment to check the robustness of the main result in Rey Biel (2005) to sequential play. We find that Equilibrium predictions work even better when the same games are played sequentially: 85% of first movers choose the Equilibrium strategy and 85% of second movers best...

The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and...

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Players are typed based on their...

This paper reports experimental evidence on behaviour in an Ultimatum Game where responders have low structural information and feedback so that they have to learn the nature of the game during repeated play. The results lend support to the view that certain learning conditions are less...

We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality...

We model a two periods market with two-sided quality uncertainty. In the first period the seller gathers information about consumers' tastes upon observing his sales. In the second period the seller may or may not deliver the information. If the monopolist must commit either to reveal or conceal...