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A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
Marinakis, Kosmas; Tsoulouhas, Theofanis - In: Journal of Economics 105 (2012) 2, pp. 161-190
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010863047
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Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?
Marinakis, Kosmas; Tsoulouhas, Theofanis - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 223-237
and local governments, in procurement, in rent-seeking contests and in tournaments used by HMOs. …A highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their … production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock. The reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666052
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Hybrid Cardinal Tournaments
Tsoulouhas, Theofanis - In: Economics Bulletin 30 (2010) 3, pp. 2279-2288
This paper proposes an alternative to standard cardinal tournaments. The analysis contrasts "hybrid" cardinal … tournaments to standard cardinal tournaments and piece rates. It shows that providing for partial insurance against common … weights), or than providing for no insurance at all via piece rates. Hybrid tournaments increase the principal's profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278509
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Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185757
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Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation
Jia, Hao; Skaperdas, Stergios; Vaidya, Samarth - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2012
function of contestants’ eort. They are used widely in many areas of economics that employ contest games, from tournaments and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011155517
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Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize
Sheremeta, Roman; Masters, William; Cason, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108366
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The Economics of doping
Berentsen, Aleksander - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002
This paper considers a strategic game in which two players, with unequal prospects of winning the game, decide simultaneously and secretly to use performance-enhancing drugs before they compete. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the favorite player is more likely to take these drugs than is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111884
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Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Schipper, Burkhard C.; Raab, Philippe - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2006
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620340
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Strategic delegation in price competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, … - 2012
We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010981941
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Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, … - 2014
We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms' workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010981949