Information acquisition and decision making in committees

This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, and (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, and decision rules of committees. We discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees.

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Alternative title:	Informationsbeschaffung und Entscheidungsfindung in Ausschüssen A survey
Year of publication:	2003-09-01
Authors:	Gerling, Kerstin ; Grüner, Hans Peter ; Kiel, Alexandra ; Schulte, Elisabeth
Publisher:	European Central Bank
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary Policy \| Gruppenentscheidung \| Group decision \| Theorie \| Theory

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Abstract
Non-technical summary
1 Introduction
2 Strategic voting versus naive voting
2.1 Sincere voting
2.2 Abstention
2.3 Unanimity
3 Incentives for information acquisition
3.1 Large committees
3.2 The case for small committees
3.3 Relation to the delegating authority
4 Conflicting interests
4.1 Caring differently about mistakes
4.2 Binary decisions and continuous information
4.3 Committee size with conflicting preferences
4.4 Decision rules with interdependent preferences
5 Communication
5.1 Irrelevance of voting rules
5.2 Imperfect aggregation and incentives
5.3 Communication and conflicting interests
6 Decision skills
7 Experimental results
8 Summary of theoretical results
8.1 How large should a committee be?
8.2 Who should be in a committee?
8.3 What is the optimal decision rule?
9 Implications for Monetary Policy Committees
9.1 Why monetary policy committees?
9.2 The optimal size of a committee
9.3 The voting rule
9.4 Who should be in a committee?
9.5 Relation to the outside
References

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009635876