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A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado
Year of publication:
2024
Authors: Sirguiado, Camilo J.
Subject: Manipulation | Matching markets | Stability | Matching | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium
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