A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

Ghislain H. Demeze-Jouatsa

I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain H.
Publisher:	Bielefeld, Germany : Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University
Subject:	Finitely Repeated Games \| Pure Strategy \| Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium \| Limit Perfect Folk Theorem \| Discount Factor \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Folk-Theorem \| Folk theorem \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Diskontierung \| Discounting