A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power

by Werner Güth; M. Vittoria Levati; Natalia Montinari; Chiara Nardi

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responderś conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Montinari, Natalia ; Nardi, Chiara
Publisher:	Jena : Univ. [u.a.]
Subject:	Ultimatum \| Yes/No game \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Ultimatumspiel \| Ultimatum game \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

freely available

Full text |

More access options

zs.thulb.uni-jena.de

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010355834

A service of the