A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder´s conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Montinari, Natalia ; Nardi, Chiara
Publisher:	Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Subject:	Ultimatum \| Yes/No game

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Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2014-015
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	786376538 [GVK] hdl:10419/104568 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435144