A note on contribution games with loss functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Russo, Giuseppe ; Senatore, Luigi
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 2, p. 211-214
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Public goods \| Intergovernmental relations \| Noncooperative games

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041716