A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms

We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism becomes equivalent to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) in which the winners are chosen simultaneously.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Kim, Sang-Hyun
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 3, p. 357-359
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contest \| Multiple winner \| Selection mechanism

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116203