A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer–seller exact representative. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Núñez, Marina
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 33.2004, 1, p. 55-65
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	assignment game \| core \| kernel \| nucleolus

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005598515