A Note on the Rationing of Divisible and Indivisible Goods in a General Network

The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to allocate goods in a fair manner amongst participating agents. The agents generally have a unit supply/demand of a good that they want to exchange with other agents. On the other hand, Bochet et al. study a more general version of the problem where they allow for agents to have arbitrary number of divisible goods to be rationed to other agents in the network. In this current work, our main focus is on non-bipartite networks where agents have arbitrary units of a homogeneous indivisible good that they want to exchange with their neighbors. Our aim is to develop mechanisms that would identify a fair and strategyproof allocation for the agents in the network. Thus, we generalize the kidney exchange problem to that of a network with arbitrary capacity of available goods. Our main idea is that this problem and a couple of other related versions of non-bipartite fair allocation problem can be suitablly transformed to one of fair allocations on bipartite networks for which we know of well studied fair allocation mechanisms