Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Manjunath, Vikram ; Westkamp, Alexander |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 193.2021, p. 1-30
|
Subject: | Individual rationality | Indivisible goods | Multi-unit demand | Pareto-efficiency | Strategy-proofness | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unteilbare Güter | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Güter | Goods | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Rationalität | Rationality |
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