A principal-agent model of sequential testing
Dino Gerardi; Lucas Maestri
| Year of publication: |
2012
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gerardi, Dino ; Maestri, Lucas Jóver |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 7.2012, 3, p. 425-463
|
| Subject: | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Description of contents: |
-- Dynamic mechanism design ; information acquisition ; sequential testing
|
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009663634