A structural model of a multitasking salesforce : incentives, private information, and job design
Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kim, Minkyung ; Sudhir, K. ; Uetake, Kosuke |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 6, p. 4602-4630
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| Subject: | adverse selection | job design | moral hazard | multidimensional incentives | multitasking | organizational economics | personnel economics | private information | salesforce compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Arbeitsgestaltung | Job design | Anreiz | Incentives | Verkaufspersonal | Salespeople | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4079 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013369092