A "threat" is a "Threat" : incentive effects of firing threats with varying degrees of performance information
Year of publication: |
February 2018
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Authors: | Brandts, Jordi ; Corgnet, Brice ; Hernán González, Roberto ; Ortiz, José M. ; Solà, Carles |
Publisher: |
Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics |
Subject: | Firing threats | incentives | monitoring | laboratory experiments | Experiment | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Brandschutz | Fire protection |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Barcelona GSE working paper series : working paper. - Barcelona, ZDB-ID 2777474-0. - Vol. no 1023 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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