A "threat" is a "Threat" : incentive effects of firing threats with varying degrees of performance information

Jordi Brandts, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, José M. Ortiz, Carles Solà

Year of publication:	February 2018
Authors:	Brandts, Jordi ; Corgnet, Brice ; Hernán González, Roberto ; Ortiz, José M. ; Solà, Carles
Publisher:	Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	Firing threats \| incentives \| monitoring \| laboratory experiments \| Experiment \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Theorie \| Theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Brandschutz \| Fire protection

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