Active agents, passive principals : does high-powered CEO compensation really improve incentives?

James Dow; Clara C. Raposo

Year of publication:	14 Febr. 2002 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
Other Persons:	Dow, James (contributor) ; Raposo, Clara (contributor)
Institutions:	Institute of Finance and Accounting <London> (contributor)
Publisher:	London : Inst. of Finance and Accounting
Subject:	Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Strategisches Management \| Strategic management \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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