Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
Ronald A. Dye; Sri S. Sridharan
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dye, Ronald A. ; Sridharan, Sri S. |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 123.2014, 3, p. 308-312
|
| Subject: | Optimal contracting | Moral hazard | Random private benefits | Depressed incentives | Increasing residual values | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401330