Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and the worth of redundant elicitation in preference aggregation : exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem

Stefano Vannucci

Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Vannucci, Stefano
Publisher:	[Siena] : Università di Siena
Subject:	Agenda manipulation \| strategy-proofness \| social welfare functions \| aggregation \| median join-semilattices \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Aggregation \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule

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