Ambiguity attitudes and self-confi rming equilibrium in sequential games

P. Battigalli, E. Catonini, G. Lanzani, and M. Marinacci

Year of publication:	[2017] ; This version: November, 2017
Authors:	Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Catonini, Emiliano ; Lanzani, Giacomo ; Marinacci, Massimo
Publisher:	Milano, Italy : IGIER, Università Bocconi
Subject:	Sequential games with feedback \| smooth ambiguity \| self-confirming equilibrium \| rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit \| Decision under uncertainty \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model

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