Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kobayashi, Norimasa ; Sasaki, Yasuo |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 53.2024, 3, p. 765-790
|
Subject: | Belief system | Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium | Static games | Steady state | Unawareness | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Rationalität | Rationality | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
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