An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hofmann, Christian ; Huddart, Steven J. ; Pfeiffer, Thomas |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7136, ZDB-ID 2004326-0. - Vol. 28.2023, 3, p. 1657-1689
|
Subject: | Dilution | Moral hazard | Optimal contracting | Pay-for-performance sensitivity | Stock option | Team compensation | Aktienoption | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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