An empirical analysis of risk, incentives and the delegation of worker authority

by Jed Devaro and Fidan Ana Kurtulus

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	DeVaro, Jed ; Kurtulus, Fidan Ana
Publisher:	Amherst, Mass. : Univ. of Massachusetts, Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Risiko \| Risk
Description of contents:	-- Agency Theory ; Risk versus Incentives Tradeoff ; Delegation of Worker Authority ; Performance Pay

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