An incentive-compatible condorcet jury theorem
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Laslier, Jean-François ; Weibull, Jörgen W. |
Published in: |
The Scandinavian journal of economics. - Oxford : Wiley, ISSN 0347-0520, ZDB-ID 8170-X. - Vol. 115.2013, 1, p. 84-108
|
Subject: | Condorcet jury | information aggregation | majority rule | strategic voting | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
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