In this paper, regulatory policies with regard to Next Generation Access (NGA) networks are analyzed through a categorisation of four-part: (i) conventional type (i.e., copper-based) regulation, (ii) no imposition of mandatory access, (iii) regulatory holiday, (iv) full deregulation. While some other approaches (e.g. publicly funded and built NGA networks, co-investment mechanisms) could be considered under this categorisation, these are found attached to or overlapping with the said four mainstream regulatory systems, which focus on differing levels of access & pricing obligations that shed light to any possible emerging model in the NGA sphere. Then the matter arises as to which model should be adopted for the emerging NGA networks that seem destined to function as the future-proof broadband access platforms on which all national and supra-national (e.g., European) policy makers concur with some ambitious objectives and timelines. For instance, under the context of EU Digital Agenda, it is targeted that all EU households should have access to at least 30 Mbps and 50% of subscriptions should be at least 100 Mbps by 2020. These policy objectives uncover the dilemma between investment and competition spurring (access & pricing) measures, also rendering the choice of regulatory regime crucial for the near future. Design of a NGA regulatory system dependent on a single type approach would be a policy option which policy makers could imitiate daring some risks and possible challenges. In this paper, common and differing aspects of each regulatory regime are emphasized also with a comparison of alternative approaches citing the literature. By and large, a widely-acknowledged categorisation is not agreed upon by the scholars, whereas many researches have been done as to the impact of regulatory approaches over the degree of NGA investments (or consumer welfare). Complementary to this, the so-called conventional mindset of granting access to existing networks for competitors via regulated (mostly cost-oriented) prices is studied empirically with mostly negative results over investment trends. The paper, examining both the empirical studies and practical findings over such debate, will not simply focus on the existing mainstream policy approaches as outlined above. Moreover, the study will be filtering main determinants of such existing models to sort out new policy roadmaps, under which NGA investment race would gain speed among stakeholders via a sustainable competition during and after the course of implementation. To that end, assymetrical regulation and micromanagement regulatory skills, representing common elements of many country approaches, are criticised and found hazardous to reach out nation-wide fiber networks. Under the study, it is concluded that while a trade-off (ensuring promotion of both competition and investment) via access prices could not be achieved in a smooth and uncomplicated manner, symmetrical sharing of existing civil engineering infrastructures would be a solution to tackle the so-called dilemma, creating for more room to reach consumer surplus via follow-on innovation. To have fiber investors level up in an equal setting and benefit first-mover advantages in a larger context, another step would be partial regulatory holiday. Under this phenomenon, NGA providers are proposed to be off the assymetrical regulatory measures for emerging networks, whilst legacy obligations still need to be kept as applicable to dominant players. In such a setting, lack of ex ante asymmetrical regulatory tools for NGA networks marks the cornerstone of the mechanism, whereby symmetric duct and facility sharing would be combined with the regulatory holiday approach so as to eliminate the attendant costs and deficits. This optimization is larger-scale one, comparing to alternative models, for instance the regulatory policy applied exclusively to pricing scheme such in EU’s 2013 Recommendation. Removal of some heavy measures (e.g. cost-oriented access charges) from the conventional type regulation would thus neither be sufficient for investments nor be rescuer from the sunk costs that is fraught with uncertain demand. Last but not the least, the study concludes that each country would modify the length of regulatory holiday as well as the reach of symmetric obligations according to the potential competitive impulses in the marketplace
