Are dynamic Vickrey auctions practical?: properties of the combinatorial clock auction

by Jonathan Levin and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Levin, Jonathan ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Publisher:	Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Inst. for Economic Policy Research
Subject:	spectrum auction \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Kombinatorische Auktion \| Combinatorial auction \| Zweitpreisauktion \| Second-price auction \| Theorie \| Theory \| Mobilkommunikation \| Mobile communications \| Konzession \| Concession \| Großbritannien \| United Kingdom \| Österreich \| Austria

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