Are relative performance measures in CEO incentive contracts used for risk reduction and/or for strategic interaction?
Dimitris Vrettos
| Year of publication: |
2013
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| Authors: | Vrettos, Dimitris |
| Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 88.2013, 6, p. 2179-2212
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| Subject: | CEO compensation | managerial incentives | strategic interaction | product market competition | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | relative performance measures | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Strategisches Management | Strategic management | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Wettbewerb | Competition | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231038