Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions

We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.

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Year of publication:	2004-03
Authors:	Fibich, Gadi ; Gavious, Arieh ; Sela, Aner
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	asymmetric auctions \| asymptotic methods \| collusion \| large auctions \| revenue equivalence \| risk-averse bidders

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 4331
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114413