Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages in a Dynamic Labor Market: A Synthesis

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) with the matching-bargaining models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP). Firms and workers form pairwise matches, workers may shirk on the job, and the wage is set in an asymmetric Nash bargain over the surplus created by nonshirking. The wage is then always higher, and employment lower, than in both the corresponding Shapiro=Stiglitz and DMP models.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Strand, J.
Publisher:	Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Subject:	wages \| bargaining \| efficiency \| labour market

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Series:	Memorandum ; 22/1998
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	865448299 [GVK] hdl:10419/90789 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:osloec:1998_022 [RePEc]
Classification:	J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010330282