Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Name Correa, Alvaro J. ; Yildirim, Huseyin |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 127.2021, p. 1-27
|
Subject: | Bias | Committee composition | Majority rule | Partisanship | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Experten | Experts | Systematischer Fehler | Entscheidung | Decision | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
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