Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting : an experimental investigation
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
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Authors: | Featherstone, Clayton R. ; Niederle, Muriel |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 100.2016, p. 353-375
|
Subject: | School choice mechanisms | Market design | Experimental economics | Matching theory | Schulauswahl | School choice | Experiment | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Matching | Experimentelle Ökonomik | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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