Efficiency and stability in large matching markets
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Tercieux, Olivier |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 127.2019, 5, p. 2301-2342
|
Subject: | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Matching | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Korrelation | Correlation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Schulauswahl | School choice | Theorie | Theory | New York |
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