Can higher rewards lead to less effort? : incentive reversal in teams
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Klor, Esteban F. ; Kube, Sebastian ; Winter, Eyal ; Zultan, Ro'i |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 97.2014, p. 72-83
|
Subject: | Incentives | Incentive reversal | Team production | Externalities | Laboratory experiments | Personnel economics | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Experiment | Anreiz | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Theorie | Theory | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Externer Effekt |
-
Group-based incentives and individual performance : a study of the effort response
Frederiksen, Anders, (2024)
-
Incentive model for operational level employee teams in an organization
Ratnayake, Vijitha, (2018)
-
Monetary and non-monetary incentives in real-effort tournaments
Erkal, Nisvan, (2018)
- More ...
-
Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? : incentive reversal in teams
Klor, Esteban F., (2011)
-
Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams
Klor, Esteban F., (2011)
-
Treating equals unequally : incentives in teams, workers' motivation, and production technology
Goerg, Sebastian J., (2010)
- More ...