Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. ; Weymark, John A. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 22.2003, 2, p. 233-243
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Theorie | Theory |
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