Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Eyckmans, Johan ; Finus, Michael |
Publisher: |
Louvain-la-Neuve : CORE |
Subject: | CLIMNEG | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Koalition | Coalition | Theorie | Theory | Welt | World | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | CGE-Modell | CGE model |
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