Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Safronov, Mikhail |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 177.2018, p. 659-677
|
Subject: | Coalition-proofness | Full implementation | Internalizing externalities | Mechanism design | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Koalition | Coalition | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji, (2011)
-
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
Guo, Huiyi, (2024)
-
Caballero, William N., (2020)
- More ...
-
Explicit renegotiation in repeated games
Safronov, Mikhail, (2014)
-
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
Olszewski, Wojciech, (2018)
-
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Olszewski, Wojciech, (2018)
- More ...