Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if the relative bargaining position changes substantially.

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Year of publication:	2013-02
Authors:	Amann, Erwin ; Leonhardt, Nadine
Institutions:	Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Subject:	Bargaining \| commitment problems \| shifts in power

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Ruhr Economic Papers. - ISSN 1864-4872.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 0403 15 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617553