Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jacquemet, Nicolas ; Luchini, Stéphane ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Zylbersztejn, Adam |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1090-2473, ZDB-ID 1467668-0. - Vol. 148.2024, p. 279-295
|
Subject: | Commitment | Communication | Cooperation | Deception | Fine | Oath | Trust game | Vertrauen | Confidence | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Mitarbeiterbindung | Employee retention | Kooperation | Ultimatumspiel | Ultimatum game | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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