Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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Year of publication:	2010-06-01
Authors:	Heller, Yuval ; Solan, Eilon ; Tomala, Tristan

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Heller, Yuval and Solan, Eilon and Tomala, Tristan (2010): Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Published in: Games and Economic Behaivor , Vol. 74, No. 1 (January 2012): pp. 222-234.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015241883