Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core is introduced, that requires credibility from the improvements.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997-11-22
Authors:	Volij, Oscar
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Asymmetric Information \| Core \| Common Knowledge

More details

Extent:	application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on PC-TEX; pages: 17 17 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118634