Computational complexity in the design of voting systems

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Takamiya, Koji ; Tanaka, Akira
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	computational complexity \| NP-completeness \| simple game \| core \| stability \| Nakamura number

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 653
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	512140677 [GVK] hdl:10419/92844 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332460