Constrained allocation of projects to heterogenous workers with preferences over peers

Flip Klijn

Year of publication:	May 2017
Authors:	Klijn, Flip
Publisher:	Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	matching \| allocation \| heterogeneous agents \| preferences over peers \| efficiency \| (group) strategy-proofness \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Matching \| Soziale Gruppe \| Social group \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice

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